Agreed, not discovered
No formula prints the true number, only a negotiation between prepared ranges.
Volume 03, Chapter 11
There is no machine that prints a business's true worth, only a negotiation between prepared ranges. Four methods, one price per share, and two silent thresholds to watch across rounds.
Run all four estimating methods before the meeting, turn the agreed number into price per share, then model dilution two rounds ahead so no control threshold gets crossed without you noticing.
No formula prints the true number, only a negotiation between prepared ranges.
A smaller slice of a bigger pizza is a win; a smaller slice of a shrinking one is a down round.
Know where 50% and 75% fall before round one, not after round two.
The same profit earns ×5 instead of ×2 when the business runs on records, not memory.
Imagine Mr A and an investor sit down to agree a price for 20% of MANIAC MINDZ. Mr A says the business is worth ₦30,000,000. The investor says ₦15,000,000. Both are guessing, and both believe their guess. There is no receipt, no price tag, no official number anywhere that says what a business is worth. So who is right?
Chapter 3 taught the arithmetic: pre-money + investment = post-money; investment ÷ post-money = investor's %. This chapter answers the question that arithmetic quietly assumed away:
And then it follows the consequences of that number through multiple investment rounds, dilution over time, price per share, and how founders keep control of their company.
Valuation is an agreement, not a discovery. There is no machine that prints a business's true worth; there are four respectable estimating methods, what it owns (assets), what it earns (profit × a multiple), what similar businesses sold for (comparables), and what it will plausibly earn (future-based), and then a negotiation between them. The founder's protection isn't a magic formula: it's knowing all four methods, running them before the meeting, and never letting the other side's spreadsheet be the only number in the room.
Add up what it owns, subtract what it owes. Hard to be worth less than your stuff.
The floorYearly profit × an agreed multiple. The workhorse most small-business deals price from.
The workhorseWhat similar businesses actually sold for. Anchors the negotiation, when the data exists.
The reality checkDiscounted future profits. Justifies high valuations, and the most argument-prone method.
The argumentAdd up everything the business owns, subtract everything it owes. This is the floor, the business can hardly be worth less than its stuff.
| MANIAC MINDZ | Amount |
|---|---|
| Machines (10, current resale) | ₦7,000,000 |
| Fabric stock + work in progress | ₦2,500,000 |
| Furniture, fittings, deposits | ₦1,500,000 |
| Cash in bank | ₦2,000,000 |
| − Debts (supplier balances) | −₦1,000,000 |
| Asset-based value | ₦12,000,000 |
Notice what it misses: the pattern library, the 7-year on-time reputation, the waiting list, everything that makes MANIAC MINDZ a machine rather than a pile of machines. Asset-based suits asset-heavy businesses ( the farm's land!) and worst-case thinking (it's exactly Chapter 6's liquidation math).
Take yearly profit; multiply by an agreed number (the multiple) representing "how many years of this profit a buyer would pay for."
| MANIAC MINDZ | Amount |
|---|---|
| Annual profit (the ₦4M from Chapter 5) | ₦4,000,000 |
| × Multiple (agreed: 5) | × 5 |
| Earnings-based value | ₦20,000,000 ← the case study's pre-money number |
Small stable businesses commonly trade at 2×–5× yearly profit; the multiple rises with growth, systems, and independence from the founder, and falls with risk and owner-dependence. This is where the whole manual pays off in real money: a documented, systemized business (Volume 02) earns a higher multiple than an identical-profit business living in one person's head.
If a six-tailor workshop across town sold last year for ₦18,000,000, that's evidence. Comparables anchor negotiations in reality, where such data exists. In small-business markets it's often scarce; use it when you can find it, and adjust for differences (their machines were older; your order book is longer).
Project future profits; discount them because promised-later money is worth less than money now. This is how Nimbus Labs justifies a valuation far above its current tiny profit, and why such valuations are the most argument-prone. For most small businesses, treat it as a sanity check, not the headline. (When the future is truly unknowable, that's the convertible loan's cue: postpone the number.)
| Method | MANIAC MINDZ says... | Weight it when... |
|---|---|---|
| Assets | ₦12,000,000 | Floor / worst case; asset-heavy businesses |
| Earnings × 5 | ₦20,000,000 | Stable, provable profits, the workhorse |
| Comparables | about ₦18,000,000 | Real sale data exists |
| Future-based | ₦22,000,000+ | High, provable growth |
The negotiation settled at ₦20,000,000 pre-money, inside the range the methods bracket. A number outside the entire range is the warning sign.
Assets set the floor. Earnings set the price. Comparables set the reality check. The future sets the argument.
Valuations become transactable through price per share:
| Step | Formula | MANIAC MINDZ |
|---|---|---|
| Price per share | Pre-money ÷ existing shares | ₦20,000,000 ÷ 800 = ₦25,000 |
| Shares for the investor | Investment ÷ price per share | ₦5,000,000 ÷ ₦25,000 = 200 shares |
| New total shares | Existing + new | 800 + 200 = 1,000 |
| Investor % | 200 ÷ 1,000 | 20% |
Same 20% as Chapter 3: but now you can see the machinery: new shares are created for the investor (Mr A doesn't hand over his own), which is precisely why everyone else's percentage falls. That is dilution, mechanically.
Chapter 3, Section 7 showed one round of dilution. Here is the full two-round story in shares and naira:
| Shares | % | Value @ round B (₦40M post) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Round A (year 0): post-money ₦25,000,000 | |||
| Mr A | 800 | 80% | |
| Mr B (new, ₦5M @ ₦25,000/share) | 200 | 20% | |
| Round B (year 2): pre-money ₦34,000,000 → ₦34,000 per share; Mr C invests ₦6,000,000 → 176 new shares (rounded) | |||
| Mr A | 800 | 68% | ₦27,200,000 |
| Mr B | 200 | 17% | ₦6,800,000 |
| Mr C | 176 | 15% | ₦6,000,000 |
| Total | 1,176 | 100% | ₦40,000,000 |
Read Mr B's row twice. His percentage fell from 20% to 17%, but his shares never changed (200), and their value rose from ₦5,000,000 to ₦6,800,000, because Round B priced shares at ₦34,000 instead of his ₦25,000. Good dilution in one row: smaller fraction, bigger pizza, richer investor.
Bad dilution is the same table with a falling share price (a "down round"), everyone's slice shrinks in both percentage and value. The defense against bad dilution isn't a clause; it's a business that keeps earning its rising multiple.
Professional investors sometimes negotiate anti-dilution protection, a promise of extra shares if a later round prices lower than theirs. Know the term exists, and know its cost: those extra shares come out of the founder's percentage. For small businesses, it's usually better left out, offer honest valuation instead.
Dilution's most important line isn't money, it's control. Two tripwires to watch across rounds:
| Threshold | Why It Matters | Mr A's Position |
|---|---|---|
| 50% | Below it, you can be outvoted on ordinary decisions | 68% after Round B, safe, for now |
| 75% (typical supermajority) | Below it, you can no longer alone pass major changes, and others can block them | Mr A crossed this at Round B (80% → 68%) without noticing |
Neither tripwire made a sound when crossed. That's the point of this section: model the cap table two rounds ahead before accepting round one, the Ownership Percentage Calculator does exactly this, and Chapter 13 explains what each threshold controls (and how non-voting classes and reserved matters change the picture entirely, Mr B's 17% carries no votes, so Mr A's voting power is still 100%... which is why share class design from Chapter 4 is the founder's real control instrument, not percentage alone).
If you arrive without your own four-method range, the meeting has one number in it, theirs. Valuation is negotiated between prepared ranges.
"×5" isn't justified by wanting it. It's justified by systems, records, growth, and founder-independence, the things this manual builds. Weak books, low multiple: Volume 04 is literally worth money here.
A too-high number from someone who failed Chapter 9's questions is bait, not a win. The partner outlasts the number.
The founder who gives 30% "because we needed it" discovers at the next round that 30% more leaves them a minority in their own company. Two rounds ahead, always, on paper.
Value your own business four ways, tonight: